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SPEED BUMPS, POTHOLES, AND
ROADBLOCKS ON THE NORTH
AMERICAN SUPERHIGHWAY
Robert A. Pastor*TWENTY years ago, President George H. W. Bush, Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and Mexican President Carlos
Salinas initialed the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), creating the largest free trade area in the world.' The three
leaders had the vision to replace nearly two centuries of distant relations
and high trade and investment barriers with the promise of a continental
market.
Despite fears in each of the three countries, by 2001 NAFTA achieved
astonishing success with regard to its trade and investment objectives.
From 1994, the onset of NAFTA, to 2001, trade had tripled among the
three countries and foreign direct investment had quintupled. 2 Integra-
tion-trade within the region as a percentage of the three countries' trade
with the world-accelerated from 36 percent in 1988, before the U.S.-
Canadian Free Trade Agreement, to 46 percent in 2001. This signified
that the three economies were making products together and integrating
their markets.
While Ross Perot had warned Americans that NAFTA would lead to
job loss, the United States during those first years of trade expansion ac-
tually generated more jobs-22 million-than in any comparable period
in its history. The region also became a formidable engine of growth,
increasing its share of world production from 30 to 36 percent.
Unfortunately, North America peaked in 2001. Since then, the rate of
trade growth among the three North American countries declined by
two-thirds, and the rate of growth of foreign investment declined by half.
The North American share of world production and the magnitude of
regional integration both returned to the points that they were at before
NAFTA.
*Robert A. Pastor is Professor and Director of the Center for North American
Studies at American University. He is the author of The North American Idea: A
Vision of a Continental Future (Oxford University Press 2011), from which this
article was adapted.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
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What accounts for the "peaking" of North America in 2001? First,
China emerged as a trade powerhouse and surpassed both Mexico and
Canada as the main source of U.S. imports. Second, despite the increase
in trade and the fact that 80 percent went overland, none of the countries
planned or invested in transportation or infrastructure to connect the new
market.3 Third, the three governments reverted to dual-bilateralism-
separate talks with each country-rather than work together and build on
the promise of North America.
There are other reasons why North America "peaked," but the timing
was not a coincidence. In fact, the most important reason was the attack
of September 11, 2001. Perhaps, if the "North American Idea"-the
spirit of working as a community of nations to improve the lives of every-
one on the continent-had been inculcated in the leadership or the peo-
ple, the three governments would have responded as one after 9/11. But
that is not what happened. After the attack, the United States built new
barriers to trade, commerce, travel, and communication with its neigh-
bors that proved to be even more formidable than the ones that had been
dismantled by NAFTA.
This essay is about those barriers, the feeble response by the three gov-
ernments to create a seamless continental market for goods and services,
and a community of three states and peoples. In the final part of the
essay, I shall outline both a vision and a blueprint for what the United
States should do to transform the new barriers into an opportunity to
deepen and strengthen North America.
I. INEVITABLE AND IRREVERSIBLE, BUT
THAT COULD CHANGE
"Economic integration within North America is not only inevitable; it
is also irreversible," insisted Thomas D'Aquino, one of Canada's most
effective and relentless advocates for trade and investment in North
America.4 The truth, however, is that interdependence is neither inevita-
ble nor irreversible; indeed, it stalled mainly because of 9/11 and has been
declining since. On that day, the U.S. government ordered officials at all
300 land, sea, and air ports-of-entry in the United States to a "level one
threat status," which meant complete examination of everything ap-
proaching the border.s Within one hour, the two borders virtually shut
down.
The United States did not need to inform Canada and Mexico what
happened because the whole world saw the attack on television, but
3. NORTHi AMERICA STEEL TRADE COMMIT[EE (NASTC), Tm BORDER STORY - A
NORTH AMERICAN STEEL IND)USTRY PERSPECTIVE 5-6 (2008), available at http://
www.nastc.org/border-story-feb_2008.pdf.
4. Stated in a meeting in early 2005 for the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force
on the Future of North America, of which he and I were both co-vice chairs.
5. For this case and similar ones, see EDWARD ALDEN, TiHE CLOSING OF1 THE AMERI.
CAN BORDER: TERRORISM, IMMIGRATION, AND SOCIAL SECURITY SINCE 9/11 18-
21 (2008).
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Canadians and Mexicans would have appreciated being consulted or even
just informed of the decision to close the borders. Both countries immedi-
ately felt the consequences. The impact of shutting the two borders was
equivalent to damming two huge, raging rivers.
Within two days, the lines of trucks waiting to cross Ambassador
Bridge into Detroit stretched for twenty miles. By then, Ford, which used
its Windsor location to supply parts for eight of its fifteen U.S. plants, was
forced to shut down five of its assembly lines and one other plant.
Chrysler shut all of its plants. Toyota cancelled shifts in its Kentucky
plants. In San Diego, traffic stalled for eight hours. President Fox later
described the economic aftermath in Mexico as "cataclysmic."6
When governments cannot locate a policy to respond to a crisis of the
magnitude of 9/11, they tend to choose one of two "default options:" they
go to war or reorganize the government. The Bush administration did
both. Bush went to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and soon
overthrew the regime. Establishing a stable government to replace the
Taliban proved to be a lot harder than either.
The job of reorganizing the U.S. government seemed more mundane,
but, in the long term, it might prove even more consequential. The Presi-
dent signed into law in November 2002 a law establishing the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). The bill did this by combining twenty-two
existing agencies with 200,000 employees. It was the second largest gov-
ernment reorganization in American history, after the establishment of
the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1947. As with the case of the
DOD, the implications of the decision to set up the DHS will reverberate
in the United States and the world for decades.
The mission of the new bureaucracy was simple and repeated as a man-
tra by every DHS official: "Close the door and stop terrorists!" In a po-
litically correct age, targeting potential suspects is viewed as "profiling,"
and to avoid being "politically incorrect," DHS targeted everyone. It dis-
carded the welcome mat and harassed everyone trying to enter the coun-
try legally.
Canada and Mexico were just gearing up to partner with the United
States to create "the most efficient border in the world" when they real-
ized that they had been transformed from policy makers to policy takers.
Border efficiency had been replaced by border security, and Canada and
Mexico were on the other side of a new fortified border.
In an interview with Joseph Misenhelter, the Director of Homeland
Security in San Diego, in October 2008, he acknowledged that, since 9/11,
DHS officers on California's border had not arrested a single person
coming from Mexico for being suspected of terrorism. This was not for
want of trying, and it also wasn't because few people cross the border.
Since 9/11, the California border has been legally crossed from the south
more than 500 million times-on average, about eighty-five million per
6. Id. at 42.
2013] 11
12 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 19
year.7
This was also true of the Canadian border. There, DHS officers were
more evasive in answering the question how many people have been ar-
rested at the border for suspicion of terrorism, usually mentioning "that a
terrorist incident" had occurred.
When one asks for specifics, they refer to the "millennium" bomber,
but he was arrested by a border guard in Washington State in 1999-
nearly two years before 9/11.
The costs and consequences of creating a mountain of restrictions since
9/11 have been exorbitant for the hundreds of millions of people who
cross the Mexican and Canadian borders each year, but because most of
these costs are not widely known, we suffer them quietly.
The problem is that within North America, businesses are not just sell-
ing products, they are increasingly making products together. These joint
efforts need a "flat" terrain. Security restrictions are like speed bumps;
they disrupt traffic and add to the cost of doing business. No one would
question their utility if they stopped terrorists, but there is little evidence
of that. This is not to suggest that we should open the borders and let
everyone pass, but we should raise questions as to the effectiveness of the
post-9/11 strategy and open our minds to the possibility of alternatives.
We have created problems on our borders and in our relationships with
our neighbors since 9/11, but the more serious problem is what we have
not done. When trade tripled, we should have built more highways to
connect the North American market, but at that very moment, a move-
ment emerged in the United States to stop construction on a mythical
twelve-lane superhighway from Mexico to Canada. The groups, which
include a resurgent John Birch Society, identify themselves as opponents
of the North American Union-also an illusory target. They fear that the
highway aims to undermine the sovereignty of the United States and fa-
cilitate migration. The fact that no such highway is either being built or
even contemplated has not deterred these groups; indeed, their hysterical
videos seem to grow in number and intensity.
While their fears of a highway are surreal, their concerns about illegal
migration are shared by a broader constituency. Indeed, when Congress
reviewed the immigration issue in 2006, the only part of a very compli-
cated bill that was approved was to construct a wall. Instead of eliminat-
ing the speed bumps and filling in the potholes or approving
comprehensive immigration reform, the United States Congress funded a
wall across 670 miles of its border with Mexico.8 The declared purpose
was to stop terrorists, undocumented workers, and drug traffickers.
7. Data provided by Vincent Bond, Office of Public Affairs, Department of Home-
land Security, San Ysidro, California, October 8, 2008. The data covers the fiscal
years from 2002-2007. During that time, 29-38 million people entered the United
States in cars, and another 7-9 million as pedestrians.
8. Randal C. Archibold & Julia Preson, Homeland Security Stands By Its Fence, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2008, at A18.
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Of course, a wall will not stop all illegal transactions. About 40 percent
of undocumented workers-including the 9/11 terrorists-enter the
United States legally with visas, and then overstay. Drug traffickers are
very adept at finding new routes. A wall can reduce illegal migration and
crime, but usually only at a few places on the border. The problem with
the wall was that it sent a message to Mexico and to Mexicans in the
United States that we view them as the problem. On the northern bor-
der, the added restrictions are an annoyance, a serious cost to commerce,
and a signal that the United States really does not trust Canadians to look
after shared security concerns.
North America's problems are speed bumps (the new 9/11 restrictions),
potholes (the failure to maintain or build roads and infrastructure), road-
blocks (policies that prevent trucks from transiting the border or picking
up return shipments), and hidden tolls (concealed taxes that encourage
inefficiency and the lack of harmonized regulations). Together, these
problems have hobbled North America, insulted our neighbors, and been
so costly as to have turned the North American advantage into a
disadvantage.
II. SPEED BUMPS
In the millennium year 2000, inspectors at all U.S. ports of entry
counted 534 million people entering the United States. Of those, 437 mil-
lion entered the United States overland legally from Mexico and Canada.
After September 11, 2001, the numbers declined each year until they
reached 250 million people in 2009. This was not due to economic reces-
sion; the numbers declined even when the economy improved. It was not
due to a problem in Mexico; the numbers declined from Canada even
more. It was not due to global restrictions; the numbers arriving by sea
and air remained steady. It was due to a "thickening" of both borders.
Almost all of the people who entered came for short periods. Many
commuted across the border, whether branch managers living in Arizona
or nurses from Windsor crossing to work in hospitals in Detroit. Roughly
one million a year came as permanent residents with the intent of immi-
grating to the United States.
Leaving aside the guns, drugs, and commerce, the U.S. government's
main preoccupation on the border is people. The legal entries each year
have ranged from 240 to 437 million people each year, but the real focus
are those who enter the United States without documents or remain after
their visas expire.
In a press conference on October 23, 2008, DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff cited estimates by the Pew Research Center that more than
800,000 illegal migrants entered the country each year from 2000 to 2005,
but he then noted the reduction to 550,000 in the following two years and
saw this as a sign that enforcement "at the border has begun to turn the
tide on illegal migration." Of course, allowing the illegal entry of a half
of a million people each year is not exactly a success story. During the
2013]1 13
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Bush years, the total illegal population in the United States increased 40
percent, from 8.4 million in 2000 to 11.6 million in 2008. In 2009, because
of the recession and more enforcement, the number fell to 11.1 million,
where it has remained through 2012.9
The two land borders have not moved or grown longer since 450 of-
ficers patrolled them in the 1920s. But from 1986 to 2001, the number of
customs agents on the southern border tripled to nearly 9,000. In com-
parison, there were only 300 border officials and 1,500 customs agents on
the 5,525 mile Canadian border. After 9/11, President Bush doubled the
number of border agents on the southern border again, and the overall
numbers grew to over 20,000 in 2009.10
The expansion in personnel coincided with a proliferation of programs
- each with its own acronym. It wasn't long before the bureaucrats had
enough acronyms to design a new game of North American Scrabble.
Citizens traveling frequently across the U.S.-Canada border need as
many as five separate credentials:(1) NEXUS, a biometric, photo ID
card, to allow fast travel across the border; (2) FAST for their commercial
vehicle; (3) TWIC for transportation workers; (4) a passport; and (5)
PASS, an e-passport in order to be compliant with the Western Hemi-
sphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). Each requires a lengthy and expensive
application process, and if someone also wanted to cross the U.S.-Mexico
border, they would need an equal number but different set of cards, each
with different acronyms."
Part of the frustration of people who cross the border regularly is that
they spend substantial money and time to acquire NEXUS or SENTRI,
and then they discover that those lanes may be slower than the others.
The requirements for truckers are even more complicated, expensive, and
duplicative. Louise Yako, vice president of the British Columbia Truck-
ing Association, complained about restrictions, duplication, and rising
costs, and feared that many of the small trucking companies would go out
of business. "They," she said, referring to the Department of Homeland
Security, "promised to consolidate the various programs and make them
9. MICIHAEi HOFFER ET AL., Es-riMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT Poru-
LATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STAI-s: JANUARY 2007 (2008), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-ill-pe_2007.pdf; Re-
marks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on the State of Immigra-
tion (Oct. 23, 2008) (on file with the journal). PEw HISPANIC CTR.,
UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS (2011), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
10. For the increase in numbers of personnel under Bush, see Chertnoff, supra note 9.
For the update under Obama, see Peter Schrag, Why Strengthening the U.S.-Mexi-
can Border Leads to More Illegal Immigration, Washington Post (July 18, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/16/
AR2010071602720.html.
11. Duir O- HOMELAND SECURITY, NEXUS FACTSIIEET (2012), available at http://
www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/trusted-traveler/nexus-prog/nexusfacts.ctt/




easier, but the requirements have multiplied and are far more costly."1 2
Yako's fears that the fees would drive small truckers out of business
proved true.
One study commissioned by the Canadian government estimated that
the total border costs and fees paid by the trucking industry was about
$10 billion.13 Numerous studies since 9/11 have assessed the length and
cause of delays and the cost to commerce and the nations, and they all
point in the same negative direction. John Taylor and Douglas Ro-
bideaux of Grand Valley State University, with George C. Jackson of
Wayne State University, calculated that the border management system
was costing both the United States and Canadian economies about $10.3
billion per year.14 This was equivalent to about 2.7 percent of merchan-
dise trade in 2001,15 which is higher than the average U.S. tariff before
NAFTA.16 This is a tax, however concealed. If the tax made us more
secure, it would be worth it, but there is no evidence that this is the case.
There are fewer studies on the U.S.-Mexico border, but their conclu-
sions are consistent with those on the northern border. The most com-
prehensive report was done by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in
Tijuana, based on an extensive survey. The study computed total costs of
delays of $436 million per year. In addition, they estimated the cost to
the local community of delays, added pollution, and job loss, and con-
cluded that they suffered $7.5 billion in lost production, nearly 300,000
jobs lost, and $1.4 billion in lost salaries.' 7
The evidence, in brief, is substantial and incontrovertible. Delays have
increased by about 20 percent for Canadians going south and 12 percent
for Americans going north to Canada according to one of the best non-
government analyses.' 8 The direct cost to the taxpayer also soared. From
2001 to 2009, the U.S. Border Patrol budget alone tripled from $1.1 bil-
12. Tiiv CAN. CIAMnR o COMMIERCE, FINDING THE BALANCE: RiDUCINo BORiDR
CosTs WnIlL STRENGTHENING SECuCrry 7 (2008).
13. See JUAN CALOs VIL A, TRANSACnON CosTs IN TiHE TRANSPORTATION SECEOR
AND INFRASTRUCTIURE IN NORII AMiRICA: ExetORING HARMONIZATION OF
STANDARis 20 U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.G.122 (2007).
14. JOHN C. TAYOR Er AL., Tm U.S.-CANADA BoRiA: CosT IMPAc-IS, CAIJSFS,




16. The average U.S. tariff rate on Mexican imports before NAFTA came into effect
was 2 percent. See DANIEL F. LDIIRMAN EL AL., LESSONS FROM NAFTA FOR
LATIN AMIERICA AND -111E CARIBBIAN 3 (2005), available at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/
geograph/northfNAFFA%20Lessons%20Executive%20Summary.pdf
17. El Cou hGIO( DE LA FRONTERA NORi, U.S.-MExico PORTS OF ENTRY: A CAPAC-
rry ANALYSIS AND RIECOMMINDATIONS FOR INCREASE) EFFICIENcy: ExiEcuIVE
SUMMARY (2007), available at http://psamex.com/pdf/1.%20Executive%2OSum-
mary. pdf.
18. HDRI.HLB Decision Econ., Inc., Imperial Valley - Mexicali Economic Delay
Study Literature Review, County Imperial, http://www.co.imperial.ca.us/IVAG/
ProjectBriefs/2007-20ImperialCountyTransPlan/Literature%20Review.pdf (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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lion to $3.5 billion,' 9 while the entire budget of Customs and Border Pro-
tection (CBP) grew from $3 billion to $10 billion.20
Canada and Mexico were initially sympathetic to the U.S. need to cre-
ate a more secure border, but they were also wary of new barriers to
trade. Canadians repackaged many of the initiatives that had been
broached over the years into a "smart borders" agreement in December
2001 that increased border security without unduly harming commerce.
The Mexican Foreign Minister tried to convince Canada to negotiate the
agreement trilaterally, but Canada rejected that approach, and so Mexico
replicated it with a similar agreement in March 2002. Despite those
agreements, intrusive restrictions proliferated.
Canadians and Mexicans resented the restrictions, as well as the way
that the U.S. government imposed them. The U.S. decision to fortify its
borders has reduced trade, investment, tourism, and jobs; all while irritat-
ing or angering its neighbors. The investment in border security was sub-
stantial, but there is no evidence that it has provided more security.
III. POTHOLES
If trucks and pedestrians only had to drive over several speed bumps,
they could manage, but in the next stage of their journey to the heart of
North America, the highway is ravaged with potholes, some so deep that
they would immobilize any vehicle. These potholes come in many forms.
Some are the old-fashioned kind caused by governments that do not
maintain roads, bridges, railroads, ports, communications, and border fa-
cilities. In those cases, vehicles break down, and there are more
accidents.
Other potholes have strange names, "drayage" and "cabotage". Both
raise the cost of trade by protecting markets rather than promoting com-
petition. "Drayage" literally means "the cost of carrying wagon," but it
actually means that many trucks are needed to do a job that one truck
could do if there were free trade. "Cabotage" restricts foreign trucks,
planes, trains, and ships from carrying shipments between cities within a
foreign country. After Canadian trucks, for example, deliver their load in
Chicago, cabotage prevents them from picking up other shipments to de-
liver to another U.S. city, and often they have to return to Canada empty,
thereby doubling the transportation cost for consumers.
NAFTA was supposed to permit Mexican trucks to cross the border by
1995, but the U.S. prevented it. Only after the World Trade Organization
authorized Mexico to raise tariffs in response to the U.S. failure to imple-
19. Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year, U.S. BORDER PATRoL,
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border-security/border-patrol/usbp-statis
tics/usbp fyll-stats/budget-stats.ctt/budget-stats.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
20. Charts: Border/Enforcement Spending and Deportation Levels Continue to Sky-
rocket Under Obama, AMERICA'S VoiciE., http://americasvoiceonline.org/research/
chartsenforcement-spending-and-deportation levels continue-to-skyrock/ (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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ment this agreement did the President, in 2011, finally allow a few trucks
to cross the border. For most of the commerce going north, at least three
trucks are still used to transport produce when only one is needed. The
Mexican government estimated that the additional "border transfer" cost
of drayage was about 15 percent of the volume of trade-or about $616
million for 2008.
The Jones Act of 1920 is one of the oldest examples of cabotage in the
United States. Its purpose is to protect and maintain the U.S. maritime
industry by preventing foreign ships from picking up cargo in the United
States and delivering it to another city in the country. The U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission estimated that the cost to the U.S. economy of
the "concealed tax"of the Jones Act was $656 million in 1999.21
If the trucks are ever able to cross the continent, they will find real
potholes-not just the political-bureaucratic kinds-in the roads, bridges,
and infrastructure. In a report to the Canadian-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary
Group, Val Meredith, a member of Parliament, wrote: "While continental
trade has skyrocketed, the physical infrastructure enabling the movement
of these goods has not." 22
There were other signs. On August 14, 2003, a few trees fell on power
lines in Ohio, and, within hours, a power outage affected fifty million
people, including one-third of the population of Canada. Bill Richard-
son, who had been secretary of energy, said the essence of the problem
was that the United States was "a superpower with a third world electric-
ity grid." Three years later, a bridge near Montreal collapsed, killing five
people.
The U.S. Department of Transportation reported that one-fourth of
America's nearly 600,000 bridges needed significant repairs. The Federal
Highway Administration reported that one-third of the country's major
roads were in substandard condition, and that this was a "significant fac-
tor" in 43,000 traffic fatalities each year.
The debt crisis of the mid-1980s compelled the Mexican government to
reduce its spending for infrastructure-from about 8 percent of GDP in
1981, to less than 2 percent in 2002. By the latter date, the World Bank
estimated that Mexico had a ten-year infrastructure deficit of $20 billion
per year.2 3 Canada, like Mexico, reduced its investments in infrastructure
significantly in order to close its fiscal deficit. By 2005, the Western
Transport Ministers reported that total government spending for infra-
structure as a proportion of GDP dropped by more than half-from 2.9
percent in 1991 to 1.4 percent in 2002-03.24
21. See JUAN CARLos ViiLIA, supra note 13 at 32.
22. Id.
23. MExico: A COMPREHENSIVE DEVIELOPMENT AGENDA FOR THE Niw ERA 2, 10-
11, 357-76 (Marcelo Guigale et al. eds. 2001).
24. Stephen Blank et al., Freight Transportation Infrastructure Policies in Canada,
Mexico, and the U.S.: An Overview and Analysis 8-9 (Ariz. State Univ. N. Am. Ctr.
for Transborder Studies, Working Paper No. 5, 2008), available at http://
courses.washington.edu/cee587/Readings/North%2OAmerica.pdf.
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After the financial crisis, all three governments diverted some funds to
infrastructure, but each tended to use local plans, rather than develop
national or continental plans. One area did witness some breakthroughs
in North American transportation-railroads-and that was mostly be-
cause the governments cleared the way to allow the private sector to inte-
grate the system. In the mid-1990s, several of the largest American
railroad companies merged. At about the same time, the Canadian and
Mexican governments privatized their railroads. Two U.S. railroads
bought Mexican railroads, and the newly privatized Canadian National
acquired assets in the United States. The result was that the railroads
became more continental.
Instead of planning for a North American highway, the United States
invested in expensive walls to separate the countries. Congress moved
with unusual speed to appropriate $2.1 billion for a 670-mile wall on the
southern border.
IV. HIDDEN TOLLS
North America's prosperity has been stunted not just by speed bumps,
potholes, roadblocks, and walls at its borders, but also by tolls that are
concealed in the higher prices consumers have to pay for North American
products. Unlike "drayage," which protects trucking firms, no one bene-
fits from these concealed taxes. They are simply the unnecessary costs of
doing business within the continent. These additional tolls fall into three
categories: (1) "rules of origin," which impose unnecessary costs at the
border in identifying the part of the product that is made in North
America; (2) trivial differences in regulations that compel exporters to
adapt their products to three different sets of regulations; and (3) taxes
that encourage inefficiency.
Michael Hart, a Canadian trade negotiator and one of the foremost
authorities of regulatory divergence in North America, defines these inef-
ficiency taxes as "the sum of duplicative regulations, border administra-
tion delays, and other regulatory impediments." The duplication occurs
when truckers (and indirectly, consumers) have to pay for multiple cre-
dentials from at least two governments to cross the border in a theoreti-
cally expedited lane and fill out slightly different customs forms on both
sides of both borders.
NAFTA eliminated tariffs among the three countries, but it allowed
each country to set its own external tariff to the rest of the world. In
order to prevent China from using one country's relatively lower tariff as
an entry point to swamp the other two markets, the three North Ameri-
can governments instituted "rules of origin" provisions. These proce-
dures require every exporter to fill out a certificate describing the origin
of each part in a product. The complicated administrative procedures
and cumbersome paperwork cost, according to Danielle Goldfarb of the
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C.D. Howe Institute in Canada, as much as $31 billion annually. 25
Another study suggested Mexico could save as much as 2 percent of
the value of its exports to the United States, which, in 2008, would
amount to $4.7 billion.26 Using a general equilibrium analysis and exam-
ining the deeper effects of the procedures on the three economies, Alex
Appiah estimated that the total cost of the "rules of origin" procedures
amounted to about 2 to 3 percent of North America's GDP. With a
GDP of $17 trillion in 2008, 2.5 percent would amount to $425 billion.27
This constitutes a colossal tax that consumers and producers unknowingly
pay in North America. A common external tariff would eliminate this
tax.
A second area where North Americans are paying taxes without get-
ting benefits is the result of different rules. "Regulatory divergence" rep-
resents the next generation of issues that the three governments need to
negotiate in order to improve market competitiveness. The logic of har-
monization is clear-cut. All three governments have laws to protect the
environment, ensure that food is safe, and guarantee good labor condi-
tions. In those cases where the laws are very different, harmonization is
not an option, but in many cases, the differences in the laws and regula-
tions are trivial-say, on the size of a label. These increase the costs of
production without benefit to society. In these cases, the three govern-
ments should negotiate a common standard.
These issues have become more important for three reasons. First, in a
free trade area, the administration of regulations has replaced the collec-
tion of customs duties as one of the main responsibilities of border ad-
ministration, and it adds considerably to the time needed to inspect
commercial shipments. Secondly, in the last two decades, most countries
have seen regulations multiply and extend to the full gamut of public con-
cerns: food and car safety, environmental protection, labor rights, market
failure, and so on.
Soon after NAFTA came into effect, the three governments set to work
to harmonize standards on the weight and length of trucks. So the ad-
ministrations convened a group-the NAFTA Land Transport Standards
Subcommittee-to harmonize the sixty-four different standards. In 1997,
the Subcommittee gave up, saying "there is no prospect of developing a
complete consensus within North America on a common set of truck
weight and dimension limits."
The OECD estimated that divergent standards add 2 to 10 percent to
25. Danielle Goldfarb, Commentary, The Road to a Canada-U.S. Customs Union:
Step-by-Step or in a Single Bound?, 184 Border Papers 8 (C.D. Howe Institute
2003), available at http://tinyurl.com/apdxn3d (automatically downloads .pdf file).
26. Olivier Cadot et al., Assessing the Effect of NAFTA's Rules of Origin (Lab.
D'Economie Appliquee, INRA Research Unit, Working Paper No. 0306, 2002),
available at http://www.inra.fr/Internet/Departments/ESR/UR/lea/documents/wp/
wp0306.pdf. Mexican exports to the United States were $216 billion in 2008.
27. Alex Jameson Appiah, Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of North American
Integration with Rules of Origin (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Simon Fraser
University) (on file with the author).
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overall costs of production.28 The NAFTA governments have been grop-
ing since 2005 for a formula to harmonize standards, but they have not
found it. Despite the high priority given to it by Presidents Bush and
Calderon and Prime Minister Harper, the governments failed even to
agree on jelly-bean regulations-an interest of Harper's-and cereal-an
interest of then-Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, a former CEO
of Kellogg.
V. THE VISION AND THE BLUEPRINT
NAFTA promoted competition transformed three national markets
into a continental market, but in the absence of measures to govern the
continental space, it failed to solve problems like harmonizing truck stan-
dards or unifying regulations on candy. It also did not share the gains of
trade, and thus income disparities widened.
The changes within and between the three countries are still not widely
understood. Mexico, the poorest and most stratified, experienced the
most profound modernization and democratization. While Mexico's mid-
dle class grew the fastest, those who were better off and in the north
benefited more. Canada kept its fiscal house in order and thus exper-
ienced a positive economic jolt, but 9/11 confounded their manufacturing
strategy and, together with the speed bumps and potholes, the country
found its entire economic trajectory at risk. Canada's dependence on the
U.S. market deepened, but the United States treated the convergence of
the two economies as if it had not happened.
The groups in the United States that opposed NAFTA initially blamed
it for the decline of manufacturing and the rise of immigration. The drug-
related violence in Mexico that exploded during the Felipe Calderon ad-
ministration led to a higher degree of collaboration between Mexico and
the United States on security issues, but at the same time, it harmed the
perception of Mexico and diverted the governments from an agenda of
economic cooperation.
Obama sought to warm the two bilateral relationships, but his agenda
was so full-with two wars, a deep recession, and health insurance-that
he could not devote the time or political capital to refashion the North
American relationship. This is the political context that explains why the
three governments failed to take any steps to flatten the speed bumps, fill
the potholes, eliminate the roadblocks, tear down the walls, and stop ex-
tracting tolls in the absence of roads. Real integration stalled and went
into reverse. The costs of doing business among the NAFTA countries
increased.
With the election of a young and vigorous President in Mexico, and the
re-election of Barack Obama in the United States, the two governments
28. MICHiAE HART, CTR. FOR N. AM. STUDIES AT AM. UNIv. and U.N. ECON.
COMM'N FOR LATIN AM. AND TlE CARIBBEAN, TRADING UP: TiiE PROSPECT OF
GREATER REGULATORY CONVERGENCE IN NORTH AMERICA, at 16, U.N. Sales
No. S.07.II.G.47 (2007).
SPEED BUMPS
have another chance to restore the promise of North America. Obama
and Pefia Nieto should join with Prime Minister Stephen Harper to pro-
pose a "North American Community" that would invigorate the three
economies, improve competitiveness vis-A-vis Asia and Europe, enhance
continental and public security, address more effectively the new transna-
tional agenda, and design 21st century, lean but effective tri-national
institutions.
The vision that undergirds this proposal is based on a principle of inter-
dependence-if one country suffers a setback, all are hurt, but a success
in one helps the others. The principle is simple, and often voiced by lead-
ers, but they rarely act on those principles. If the United States actually
accepted its "shared responsibility" for the drug problem, it would not
permit the 7,500 gun shops on the U.S. side of the border to sell assault
weapons to the drug cartels. If all three countries actually incorporated a
sense of Community, they would advertise "Buy North American" in-
stead of respective national products.
The word "Community" refers to a group in which the members feel an
affinity and desire to cooperate. It is not a Union, and the NAFTA coun-
tries' relationship would differ from Europe's, though it should try to
learn from EU experiences in order to avoid mistakes and adapt suc-
cesses. A "Community" should be flexible, allowing for the three coun-
tries to define the new relationship that they would seek.
In December 2011, the United States and Canada presented "Action
Plans" on the border and regulatory convergence. The United States and
Mexico repeated the same exercise. The three countries restated the goal
on borders that they did a decade before in the two "Smart Borders'
Agreement"-to make the border efficient and secure. And they af-
firmed the need to harmonize regulations just as they did in 2005 when
they established the Security and Prosperity Partnership-to avoid "the
tyranny of small differences in regulations" that serve only to protect
companies rather than consumers. Instead of taking actions, the Plans
actually proposed studies and pilot projects. The leaders called the plans
"game-changers," but anyone who bothered to read them knew they
were playing the same games.
It is clear that the only way to move forward on the agenda is for the
leaders to give North America a high priority and organize their govern-
ments to accomplish their goals. They will also need tri-national institu-
tions, because the three governments are not designed to think
continentally. They should start with a North American Advisory Com-
mission to do research and prepare continental options for all three lead-
ers to consider and choose at annual summits. They should encourage
the two bilateral legislative committees to merge into a single North
American Parliamentary Committee.
The three leaders of the nations should call for a North American Plan
for Transportation and Infrastructure, and establish a North American
Investment Fund that would connect the poorest southern regions of
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Mexico with the richer North American market. Such a Fund would cre-
ate the infrastructure in the south of Mexico that would attract invest-
ment and jobs and thus reduce migration to the border and the United
States.
To create a seamless market, the three countries should negotiate a
Common External Tariff. This would eliminate the excessive "rules of
origin" tax of about $500 billion per year, and the common tariff would
yield about $45 billion per year, which could be placed in the North
American Investment Fund to build continental corridors. With a sense
of Community, the three governments could then eliminate unnecessary
border restrictions, expand educational opportunities across the conti-
nent, harmonize and lift environmental and labor standards, and train tri-
national teams of customs officers. These steps would begin to invigorate
the sleeping giant of North America.
In November 2011, President Barack Obama toured Asia and commit-
ted the United States to negotiating a "Trans-Pacific Partnership" (TPP)
in order to harness Asian dynamism for the benefit of the U.S. economy.
This seems like a good idea, but is actually a strategic mistake because it
diverts scarce U.S. attention from a project that would have a more
profound and positive effect on the U.S. economy and society-deepen-
ing economic integration in North America.
It is unrealistic to expect these ideas to become policy in a short time.
Big ideas take time for the body politic to absorb. When American wo-
men convened a meeting in Seneca Falls, New York in 1848 to seek the
right to vote, no one would have thought it would take seventy-one years
to succeed.
Still, this does not mean we should give up or slow our efforts. Repre-
sentatives from the border regions could generate support for the "North
American Idea." The three leaders could begin by articulating a vision
and announce a merging of the two sets of working groups on borders
and regulations into a single North American group. They could ask their
Ministers of Transportation to develop a North American Plan. They
could allocate just $15 million for scholarships and support for Research
Centers for North America.
None of the many proposals that have been advanced for the region
can be achieved without such a vision. Americans and Canadians will not
provide funds to a North American Investment Fund to narrow the de-
velopment gap with Mexico without a convincing vision of how Mexico's
growth will benefit their countries. There is little prospect of reaching an
agreement on labor mobility, on harmonizing environmental standards,
on forging a transportation plan, or any proposal that would cost money
or change the status quo unless there is a vision of a wider Community
that could attract the support of the people and their legislatures.
A vision can inspire the three nations to rethink and renew North
America.
